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Abstract 
Malpractice in food production entails unacceptable procedures and undesirable product quali-
ties and other negative material outcomes. Despite their physical implications, behavioural
sources of risk have become known as moral hazards. The probability of malpractice increases
with attached profits. It decreases with the probability of disclosure and resulting losses. It also
decreases with social values, emotional bonds etc. which prevent food producers from yielding
to economic temptations. Trust can be generated both by reducing the profitability of malprac-
tice and by enhancing social trust factors. Referring to Hennessy et al. (2003), who conclude
that misdirected incentives are a major source of food risk, we focus on the former and analyse
the incentives related to various regulations in grain production.
Keywords: behavioural risk, moral hazard, incentive-compatibility, trust
1 Introduction: the Moral Hazard Problem in Food Production
Risks stemming from food production may be caused by technological hazards, i.e. by a genu-
ine lack of knowledge about the stochastic effects of complex production processes, or by
safety breakdowns caused by unintentional human or technical failures. They may, however,
also be caused by food business operators who breach the rules that are aimed at protecting
consumers’ health, the environment etc. Suppliers of food products, e.g., might exploit the fact
that - due to information asymmetries - their production activities as well as resulting product
properties cannot be directly observed by buyers (be they downstream food business operators
or consumers). From the buyers’ point of view, the fact of asymmetric information is some-
times described with the term credence quality. Credence qualities involve both “simple” qual-
ity risks (i.e. the risk of being deceived with regard to a product’s quality category) and
“serious” health risks (i.e. the risk of using or consuming substances which are harmful).
While being tantamount to technological practices and while leading to downstream disecono-
mies and unacceptable physical outcomes such as consumers’ exposure to increased residue
levels, the threat of opportunistic malpractice has been labelled moral hazard, emphasising
both the underlying cause of risk and the direction of potential countermeasures. 
Non-compliance with regulations and contractual agreements may often be more profitable
than compliance. This is the reason why measures aimed at eliminating misdirected incentives
are an important field of action for public authorities who act on behalf of consumers (citizens)
as well as for downstream food business operators who are interested in the quality of pur-308   Trust and the Profitability of Rule-Breaking in Grain Production
chased inputs. Interested parties need to assess behavioural risks in order to identify those food
chain activities where deviance is a viable proposition for food business operators. They then
need to manage behavioural risks by designing incentive-compatible contracts and by fostering
trust factors. Incentive-compatible contracts (if available at reasonable costs) would work
independent of moral attitudes since they eliminate the temptations to infringe upon rules and
replace the need for character trust by situational trust (cf. Noorderhaven, 1996).
We attack the behavioural source of risks in grain production by analysing the monetary incen-
tives from an operational-level moral hazard perspective. The context is that of a farmer (agent)
and a corn dealer or public authority (principal). Procedural decisions made by the farmer
affect the probability distributions of product properties and other outcomes. The principal,
however, cannot contract contingent on actual actions because he cannot fully observe them
(asymmetric information). Moreover, he cannot directly observe the outcome either. 
Moral hazard models, also known as principal agent (PA-) models, have the capacity to pro-
vide structural insights into real-life problems such as behavioural food risks and other situa-
tions characterised by asymmetric information (cf. Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1987). However,
sound empirical estimates of parameters such as prices, costs of compliance, frequency of con-
trol etc. are needed to facilitate practical conclusions. That is, we need suitable methods to
obtain estimates for the parameters that define the players’ payoffs. We also need to specify
adequate models. Since expert opinion is the main source of information in most empirical
contexts, suitable methods of empirical social research need to be found for the collection and
systematisation of this information. Furthermore, general PA-models as found in the game-the-
oretic literature (cf. e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Grossmann and Hart, 1983; Kreps, 1990)
need to be modified into “leaner” models (cf. Hirschauer, 2004) which account for the limited
availability of data and facilitate an analysis with reasonable efforts and costs.
A significant knowledge gap exists with regard to the impact of product inspection and trace-
ability. While a few authors consider partial inspection and multiple agents (c.f. e.g. Demski
and Sappington, 1984; Fox and Hennessy, 1999; Starbird, 2005), the fact that quality can usu-
ally only be observed through random inspections and the fact that product irregularities can-
not always be traced are still to be incorporated into applicable models in the food context. 
2 Offence-prone Regulations in Grain Production
We tentatively assessed potential temptations to disregard rules in modern grain farming by
interviewing an expert (insider), i.e. a large-scale farmer in Germany. Offence-prone regula-
tions concern a wide diversity of production-related activities and refer, e.g., to food safety and
environmental issues. Using the evidence that the farmer provided with regard to the immi-
nence of various offences, we examine the incentive situation in the following situations. 
1. Conventional grain farmers regularly spray fungicides five to six weeks before harvesting.
Applied products are labelled for control of fungal infections (fusaria, erysiphe graminis)
which reduce the grain quality. Farmers might be tempted to breach the waiting period of
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2. In humid years, farmers oftentimes apply pre-harvest herbicides (roundup) in order to kill
all green plants, thus accelerating the necessary drying of plant material. The required wait-
ing period between spraying and harvesting is 10 days. Again, farmers might be facing sig-
nificant economic temptations to infringe upon the waiting period.
3. While being an effective and low-cost herbicide for control of apera spica-venti
(Windhalm), the use of Isoproturon (IPU) is ruled out for a variety of soil types as well as
for certain time periods. The use of alternative herbicides without restrictions increases
costs by 20 €/ha. Thus, farmers may be tempted, e.g., to use IPU outside the authorised
period.
4. Some farmers may have remaining stocks of pesticides the use of which has been ruled out
(e.g. maize herbicide Simazin, DDT) and which are to be professionally decontaminated.
Farmers may be tempted to illegally use old pesticide stocks both because they are highly
effective and because they would be costly to dispose of legally. 
5. Farmers are required to leave a minimum distance between spraying areas and neighbour-
ing waters. Temptations to break these rules might result from the fact that spraying will
increase the quantity and quality of grain produced from the concerned acreage. 
6. Only trained personnel with an official licence is authorised to handle pesticides and oper-
ate dispersion appliances. Often, only one employee has gone through the required train-
ing. In case of sickness, the employer may face temptations to assign the urgent spraying
tasks to non-trained personnel because they cannot be delayed without economic losses. 
Using a straightforward principal agent model, we investigate grain farmers’ incentives
regarding compliance with these six regulations. That is, we identify critical situations accord-
ing to the rationale that offences are most imminent if their technological viability coincides
with a high level of misdirected economic incentives. 
3 Economic Incentive Analysis
3.1    The Model
With a view to the empirical application, we resort to a general discrete PA-model as
described, for instance, by Kreps (1990 p. 577). The model assumes that a risk-averse agent
has opportunity costs (reservation utility)   for accepting a contract. After accepting, he has
the choice between discrete actions an (n = 1,2,…,N) and corresponding deterministic efforts
kn < kn+1. In a stochastic environment, these actions result – with given probabilities πnm – in
discrete outputs ym < ym+1 (m = 1,2,…,M). For these outputs the principal defines output-
dependent remunerations wm <w m+1. The agent’s utility depends on his remuneration and
effort ( ), where u(wm) represents a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. If
the principal is risk-neutral, his design problem can be stated as follows:
μ
n m k w u − ) (310   Trust and the Profitability of Rule-Breaking in Grain Production
Step 1: determine the minimum wage costs wmin(an) for each possible action 
            (1)
(participation constraint)             (2)
(incentive compatibility constraint)   (3)
Step 2: determine the maximum payoff over all actions an
          (4)
Since expert opinion is the source of information for quantifying the model parameters in
many food risk contexts, we adjust the general PA-model to the availability of data by making
the following modifications: (i) We apply a binary perspective and consider only two possible
actions (a1 = non-compliance; a2 = compliance), two corresponding effort levels (k1 < k2), two
outcomes (y1 < y2), and two remunerations (w1 < w2). This enables us to use expert estimates
in the form of binomial distributions for variables such as outcome and remuneration.
(ii) Instead of accounting for risk aversion endogenously, we assume risk neutral principals
and agents in model calculations. Therefore, optimal risk sharing will not be our concern here.
(iii) We assume a reservation utility μ  = 0. This reflects a situation with binding regulations
where the agent has to refrain from production if he does not officially “participate”. (iv)
Assuming that the principal is pre-determined to induce compliance and only strives to do so at
minimum (budgetary) costs, the second step of the optimization can be omitted and the prob-
lem is reduced to cost minimization. (v) We take into account that observation regularly takes
the form of random inspections carried out with a control intensity s ≤ 100 % which deter-
mines the disclosure probability if there are no other sources of detection. (vi) With a view to
product inspection, we incorporate a tracing-probability coefficient z ≤ 100 %, taking into
account that identified irregularities are not (or cannot) always (be) retraced to single sellers. 
Instead of simply reformulating the Kreps-model for the above-mentioned modifications we
now use the handier notation from table 1. Both a control intensity s < 100 % and a traceability
z < 100 % influence the expected remuneration for non-compliance w(a1) and for compliance
w(a2). In the case of random product inspections, e.g., the buyer (principal) has to pay P when-
ever the quality is not ascertained or cannot be ascribed to a single agent. The agent can only
be made to pay a sanction S if the undesired quality y1 is evidently his making.
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Table 1. Notation for the binary food risk model
Additionally considering the control costs depending on the intensity c(s) and the costs of 
imposing sanction c(S), the principal’s design problem can be restated as follows: 
                         (1’)
                                                                  (2’)
                                                     (3’)
While there are only few parameters to be considered in the model, their empirical estimation
still represents a formidable task. It is not trivial, for instance, to define different control alter-
natives and to provide their cost estimates (let alone intensity-dependent control cost functions
c(s) for different control systems and technologies). In our case study, we therefore solely
assess the current incentive situation and tentatively investigate incentive-compatible alterna-
tives through variant calculations. That is, we determine the parameters K, q, r, s, z, P, and S,
and then use Eq.(3’) to quantify resulting incentives.
3.2    Farmers’ Economic Decision Parameters 
Table 2 summarises the parameter values that are attached to the offence prone regulations 
listed in section 2 according to the perception of the interviewed farmer. Due to the related 
interpretation of most parameters, as well as due to the limits regarding the length of this 
paper, we hereafter only comment on the parameters of the first regulation in detail. 
w1 =– S  sanction inflicted on the agent if the undesired outcome y1 is detected 
w2 =  P  price paid for the desired outcome y2
k2-
k1=k2
=  K  agent’s cost of compliance with regulations
π11 =  r  probability of undesired outcome y1 in case of non-compliance (i.e. action a1)
 szr probability to get remuneration –S in case of non-compliance (with sz < 100 %)
π12 =  1-r probability of desired outcome y2 in case of non-compliance (i.e. action a1)
 1-szr probability to get remuneration P in case of non-compliance (with sz < 100 %)




probability to get remuneration P in case of compliance (with sz <1 0 0% )
π21 =  1-q probability of undesired outcome y1 in case of compliance (i.e. action a2)
 sz(1-
q)
probability to get remuneration –S in case of compliance (with sz <1 0 0% )
 s intensity (frequency) of random controls (0 < s 100 %)
 z probability that responsible suppliers are traced (0 < z 100 %)
() ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 S c s c S P q sz P Min S c s c a w Min + + + ⋅ − ⋅ − = + +
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( . . 2 2 ≥ − + ⋅ − ⋅ − = − K S P q sz P k a w t s
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 2 2 ≥ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ = − − K S P r q sz a w k a w
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Table 2. Economic decision parameters for offence-prone activities in grain production*
* All monetary values are indicated per hectare. If the interviewee provided absolute figures per farming enter-
prise, they were transformed in a per hectare basis according to the size of the farm the interviewee had in mind.
** if the farmer harvests 6 days prematurely; *** if the farmer harvests 3 days prematurely
After the last pre-harvest application of fungicides, farmers might, under certain weather con-
ditions, be tempted to breach the minimum waiting period of 35 days. In the interview, we
focused, amongst others, on weather conditions which make it “technologically optimal” to
harvest 6 days prematurely. Using the interviewee’s situation, we assume a transaction context
where farmers sell their wheat to a corn dealer who takes and stores samples from all individ-
ual trailer loads, tests them for their technological qualities (humidity, protein content etc.) and
differentiates prices for different quality categories. According to interview evidence, corn
dealers usually blend the individual “loads” into “batches” before testing for pesticide resi-
dues. Thus, infringements are only detected if the blended batch exceeds the tolerance limits.
This happens only if a critical number of farmers simultaneously break the rule. Otherwise,
residues are “sufficiently” diluted and free-riders stay undetected because they run virtually no
other risk of being found out.
(a) The interviewed farmer thinks that, in case of compliance with the waiting period, one runs
no risk at all to exceed the residue limit in his grain (1-q =0 ) .   (b) If weather conditions favour
harvesting 6 days early, the farmer estimates that non-compliance with the remaining waiting
period increases the probability of exceeding the residue limit to r =5% .   (c) In the considered
case, the detection probability s does not only reflect the control intensity, but also a dilution





























































































































































































































































analytical control of product X X
analytical control of soil X X X
observation of activity X X
Relevant parameters
(a) probability of desired outcome 
in case of compliance (q)
100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
(b) probability of undesired outcome 
in case of non-compliance (r)
**5 % ***10 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
(c) probability that an irregularity 
is detected (s)
5  %5 %5 %5 % 2 5 % 1 0 %
(d) costs (€/ha) arising from compli-
ance with the rules (K)
100 90 20 50 250 120
(e) “price” (€/ha) paid for desired 
outcome (P)
984 984 984 984 984 984
(f) “sanctions” (€/ha) if non-compli-
ance is proven (S)
1 100 1 100 50 75 2 000 10
(g) probability that the farmer 
can be traced (z)
100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %Norbert Hirschauer and Oliver Mußhoff    313
being tested for residues. While ignoring the actual percentage of batches that are controlled as
well as the determinants of the dilution effect (such as one’s own share in a batch and the
behaviour of other farmers), the farmer provided an ad hoc estimate of s = 5% regarding the
joint effect of both factors (i.e. the probability that an irregularity is detected if one’s individual
load exceeds the limit). (d) The compliance costs K = 100 €/ha also arise from two sources: if
it is technologically optimal to harvest 6 days early the farmer expects a 50%-threat that the
grain degrades from food to feed grain quality, resulting in an expected loss of 87.5 €/ha. He
also expects an increase of machinery costs by 12.5 €/ha due to rougher harvesting conditions.
(e) The farmer is convinced that, due to cross-compliance regulations, income from wheat
sales and EU-subsidies - adding up to P = 984 €/ha - would be lost if an offence was detected.
(f) The farmer estimates that one would have to pay an equivalent of 350 €/ha in direct sanc-
tion payments such as fines, damage compensations etc. in case of detection. Furthermore, he
estimates that capitalized future losses on the market would amount to a net present value of
750 €/ha, adding up to a sanction S = 1 100 €/ha. (g) The farmer is convinced that individual
loads are traced if irregularities are found in the blended batch (z = 100%). He thinks that the
samples that were stored from individual loads according to EU-regulations will all be tested
despite the costs of chemical analysis if problems are found.
For the sake of a straightforward interpretation of table 2 we will also briefly comment on the
relevant aspects of the other five regulations: (a) the perception of a probability q = 100 % (i.e.
there is no risk of producing the undesired outcome in case of compliance) applies to all cases.
(b) In the case of offences with regard to regulation 1 and 2, the farmer expects a beneficial
stochastic effect from the environment, resulting in low probabilities r = 5 % and 10 %,
respectively, despite non-compliance. In contrast, in cases 3 to 6 he is convinced that an
offence produces a deterministic result regarding the observable negative outcome
(r = 100 %). He believes, for instance, that a chemical analysis of the soil would provide
unambiguous evidence if rule 3, 4 or 5 had been broken. (c) While dilution in blended batches
plays a similar role for offences 1 and 2, the detection probability s of all other offences simply
reflects the inspection intensity. (d) Compliance costs K comprise several components that dif-
fer from regulation to regulation. In the case of an illegal use of Simazin remainders, for
instance, they arise from reducing expenses for new pesticides as well as from saving the costs
of legal disposal. (e) While not being well informed concerning the new cross-compliance reg-
ulations, the farmer’s perception is that – for all offences considered - market income as well
as EU transfer payments would be completely lost for the concerned acreage if an offence was
proven. (f) While not being well informed either with regard to the sanctions, the farmer “has
heard stories”. This results in a differentiated subjective perception of imminent sanctioning
for the various offences under investigation. (g) Despite the fact that, in cases 1 and 2, controls
are only made at the downstream control point “blended batch”, the traceability amounts to
z = 100 % because samples are taken from individual loads. In all other cases, the traceability
coefficient z can be equated with unity because we observe informational signals which are
unambiguously attached to the agent (e.g. residues in the farmer’s soil). 
3.3 The Resulting Incentive Situation
Part A of table 3 indicates the incentive situation resulting from the parameter values indicated
in table 2. There is a significant temptation to break the regulations 1, 2 and 6 according to the314   Trust and the Profitability of Rule-Breaking in Grain Production
farmer’s perception of relevant parameters. It would be unprofitable, in contrast, to infringe
upon the regulations 3 to 5. The perception of a comparably high deterrent regarding offence 5
is due to the farmer’s understanding that disregarding the minimum spraying distance to waters
would be visible to the naked eye (s = 25 %) and that the sanction – at a per hectare rate –
would be very high (S = 2000 €/ha). 
Table 3. The incentive situation for various parameter constellations
Resorting to Eq.(3’) a critical value analysis (see part B of table 3) reveals which change of
sanction and controls would ensure/maintain incentive-compatible contracts. In all cases under
consideration, the participation constraint (Eq.2’) does not need to be accounted for in such an
analysis. In contrast, it is possible to design “boiling-in-oil-contracts” (cf. Rasmusen, 1994
p. 180) since the probability of the desired product quality is q = 100 % for complying farmers.
Thus, they can be assumed to be neither affected by increased sanctions nor by intensified con-
trols. If present prices and controls are maintained, the perceived sanctions in case 1 (2, 6) need
to be increased from their present level of 1100 €/ha (1100, 10) to 39016 €/ha (17016, 216) in
order to eliminate the temptation to break the rule. In all other cases, sanctions could be
reduced to the indicated levels without jeopardising the incentive-compatibility. Increasing the
probability of being detected to s = 25 % in all considered cases, allows for a general decrease
of sanctions. In cases 3, 4 and 6 no sanctions would be needed at all.
A realistic model which tries to reconstruct the decision situation needs to incorporate the rele-
vant factors as perceived by decision-makers. The actual behaviour of farmers in the light of
temptations to break rules is not known. It seems reasonable to picture farmers through a typol-
ogy consisting of two extreme- and one mixed-type decision-maker: (i) the one extreme is the
farmer whose character is utterly trustworthy. Because of his personal set of preferences he
resists every perceived economic temptation to break the rules. (ii) The other extreme is the
farmer who is only trustworthy if, given his exclusive objective of maximising profits, the per-
ceived situational incentives of the contract are “right”. (iii) Between these two is the mixed-
type who accepts a profit trade-off in exchange for a personal feeling of moral integrity result-
ing from his rule-abiding behaviour. He might yield to rule-breaking behaviour, however, if



























































































































































































































































A: economic inferiority (-) / superior-
ity (+) of compliance (€/ha)
-95 -80 32 3 496 -21
B: ceteris paribus critical sanction 
level S (€/ha)
39 016 17 016 - 16 16 216
ceteris paribus critical detection 
probability s
96.0% 43.2% 1.9% 4.7% 8.4% 12.1%
critical sanction level S
for s =2 5%  ( € / h a )
70 1 6 26 1 6 - - 1 6 -Norbert Hirschauer and Oliver Mußhoff    315
4 Outlook
Designing effective measures against behavioural risks requires systems analysis approaches
which consider all relevant factors that motivate human behaviour. Game-theoretic PA-models
are efficient means to process quantifiable information regarding payoff relevant economic
factors, even though this information will often need to be based on expert opinion. Going
beyond the critical value analyses of this paper, identifying optimal incentive-compatible con-
tracts would require that, besides remuneration costs, we consider the costs of different control
and sanction regimes. Estimates are needed, e.g., for the costs of control depending on the
intensity, for the costs of imposing sanctions, and, in the long run, even for the costs of chang-
ing the overall chain structures. Furthermore, the problem needs to be attacked of how to deal
with agents that are heterogeneous, e.g., with regard to their type or their compliance costs.
That is, the adverse selection aspect of the incentive problem needs to be considered.
Despite efforts aimed at designing optimal contracts, misdirected economic incentives may
persist because they cannot be reduced to zero with reasonable costs. The search for optimal
trust systems requires, on the one hand, the consideration of the marginal returns of measures
that reduce misdirected incentives and, on the other hand, of activities that enhance trust fac-
tors in the social context. It also requires that we account for the interdependence of both types
of measures such as dysfunctional effects of increased controls which might arise in situations
with heterogeneous agents where the trustworthy ones are control-averse. Trust factors in
social contexts, even though they may represent crucial determinants of behaviour, are intrinsi-
cally hard to quantify and usually resist their representation in formal models. Future research
aiming to improve our understanding of what it is that makes food producers choose certain
actions should therefore integrate economic and non-economic social science disciplines and
combine the relative merits of their respective approaches and toolboxes. We apply, for
instance, an economic-criminological approach in a project that examines moral hazard in the
poultry industries. This project looks at the economic temptations to disregard rules as well as
at the so called “protective factors” (bonds to norms) that reduce the actors’ freedom to do so
(Braithwaite, 2003; Tittle, 2000). It seems sensible to exclude social factors from formal mod-
els even though they are payoff (utility) relevant. A criminological analysis, e.g., guarantees
that – instead of being merely considered as constraints or subordinate objectives in a formal
economic model – social factors are considered in their own right by using an adequate toolbox
and a complementary social-psychological perspective. 
While the tentative investigation of this paper has illustrated the capacity of moral hazard ap-
proaches to behavioural risks, revealing relevant regularities and providing decision support
also requires that we enlarge the data base: first, with regard to grain production, the information
resulting from interviews with one randomly selected farmer should be complemented by a
broad investigation of representative samples of farmers in different regions, with different farm
sizes, with different socio-economic characteristics etc. Second, a nearly endless number of ac-
tivities on all levels of the grain chain and other food chains may represent sources of behaviou-
ral risks. They all lend themselves to the above-described incentive analysis. However, given
budgetary constraints and the costs of investigations, one will first need to scan the food chains
and to gather expert knowledge in order to narrow down the number of in-depth investigations
to the most imminent threats. 316   Trust and the Profitability of Rule-Breaking in Grain Production
Future work should also focus on the development of easy-to-apply tools that can be used, e.g. by
public authorities, for a systematic analysis and prevention of behavioural risks on all levels of
food chains. Extending efforts to a systematic analysis of behavioural risks in the food sector at
large may require that the structure of the above-described PA-model is developed further and
extended with regard to its restrictive assumptions. It may also require that we develop and use
approaches from the social sciences that are apt to dig deeply into the social determinants of
trust, for instance, by including ethnographic perspectives and concepts of comparative devi-
ance and cultural criminology (Presdee, 2004). With a view to a realistic assessment of the pos-
sibilities of asserting the necessary changes, this should be accompanied by an institutional
analysis of relevant societal subsystems. While the particular contributions of various groups of
actors are crucial for implementing change, different actors may follow their own rationalities and
thus oppose changes whenever central control/enforcement is lacking.
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